HR-2021-2404 states that the Insurance Contracts Act (fal) § 8-5 (2) is a statute of limitations, and not another type of time limit rule.
The case concerned the question whether the policyholder’s claim for compensation after a fire in their home, is obsolete. The Supreme Court had to decide whether (fal) § 8-5 (2) is a statute of limitations, or another type of time rule.
The insurance company informed the policyholder that a summons must be filed within one year of the conciliation council’s suspension, cf. fal. 5-8 (2), so the effect of interrupted limitation does not cease. However, the policyholder did not issue a summons until one year and ten months later. The policyholder stated that he had interrupted the deadline by withdrawing the settlement appeal.
The Supreme Court stated that the effect of the interruption of the time limit is regulated by the Dispute Act (tvl) § 18-3 (2), which means that the policyholder must have issued a summons within one year after the conciliation council suspended the processing of the case, to retain its claim.
The judgment means that the limitation period in fal. § 8-5 (2) takes over for fal. § 8-6 when the six-month time limit is invoked by the company in the event of refusal of insurance.
One consequence of the fact that fal. § 8-5 (2) and § 18-5 (2) are to be regarded as limitation rules, is that the other provisions of the Limitation Act will apply. It is also noteworthy that policyholders must ensure that the effect of interruption of deadlines is maintained when an appeal to the Conciliation Board or the Financial Appeals Board does not lead to a decision on the merits. Another important consequence is that the statute of limitations' rules on time-out interruptions supplement § 8-5 (2) / 18-5 (2).
The verdict is unanimous, and in line with the insurance company's understanding of the relationship between fal. § 8-5 (2) and § 8-6.